不同主导力量下供应商减排投资的谎报与协调策略

在碳交易政策下的两级低碳供应链中，针对供应商可能利用私有成本信息增加自身利润损害零售商和供应链绩效的问题，探讨供应商投资减排后不同主导力量下供应商的成本信息谎报行为和供应链协调策略。研究发现，供应链主导力量对供应链利润在供应链成员间的分配、供应链的整体绩效和供应商的最优成本谎报策略均有影响。供应商主导型供应链中，供应商不会谎报其成本信息；零售商主导型供应链中，供应商在一定条件下会采取相应的谎报策略以使自身利润最大化，影响减排量、低碳产品零售价格以及零售商和供应链的绩效等。因此，设计一种固定减排量下依赖于批发价格的线性补贴惩罚机制进行协调。在合适的契约参数设置下，此机制在激励供应商反馈真实成本信息的同时能够实现低碳供应链的完美协调，且能将供应链利润在零售商和供应商之间进行自由划分。最后，通过数值分析对结论进行验证并探讨了谎报因子与零售商和供应商利润的关系。

Misreporting Strategies and Coordination with Supplier’s Carbon Emission Reduction Investment Under Different Market Powers

Considering different market powers, this paper contributes to cost misreporting strategies and coordination in two-echelon low-carbon supply chains where there exists the problem that the supplier who invests in carbon emission reduction under the cap-and-trade policy may take advantage of his private cost information to increase his own profit, which damages the performances of the retailer and the whole supply chain. It is found that the supply chain dominance does have an influence on the profit distribution between the supply chain members, the whole supply chain performance, and the supplier’s optimal cost misreporting strategies. The supplier will not misreport his cost information when he himself is the supply chain leader but misreports cost information in the retailer-led supply chain to maximize his profit under certain conditions. A type of linear compensation-punishment mechanism with fixed emission reduction depending on the wholesale price is proposed to coordinate this asymmetric phenomenon. With appropriate contractual parameters, the coordination mechanism can achieve a perfect coordination of the low-carbon supply chain and distribute the supply chain profit between the supplier and retailer freely while it motivates the supplier to feedback true cost information. Finally, the effects of misreporting factors on the supplier and the retailer’s profits are validated and discussed through numerical analysis.