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军事威慑中试探策略博弈分析
引用本文:向钢华,王永县.军事威慑中试探策略博弈分析[J].系统工程,2005,23(9):4-7.
作者姓名:向钢华  王永县
作者单位:清华大学,经济管理学院,北京,100084
摘    要:在标准两阶段军事威慑博弈基础上构建了带有挑战者试探策略和含有信号传递子博弈的三阶段威慑博弈模型,分析了该博弈的混同均衡和分离均衡,提出了军事威慑博弈中试探策略有效运用的基本条件。

关 键 词:军事威慑  试探策略  信号博弈  混同均衡  分离均衡
文章编号:1001-4098(2005)09-0004-04
收稿时间:2005-06-12
修稿时间:2005年6月12日

Game-theoretical Analysis of Probe Strategy in Military Deterrence
XIANG Gang-hua,WANG Yong-xian.Game-theoretical Analysis of Probe Strategy in Military Deterrence[J].Systems Engineering,2005,23(9):4-7.
Authors:XIANG Gang-hua  WANG Yong-xian
Institution:School of Economics and Management,Tsinghua University,Beijing 100084,China
Abstract:In this paper a three-stage deterrence game model with probe strategy and signalling subgame is constructed based on the standard two-stage military deterrence. Its pooling equilibria and separating equilibria are also analyzed. And the conditions for the effective application of the probe strategy in military deterrence are put forward.
Keywords:Military Deterrence  Probe Strategy  Signalling Game  Pooling Equilibrium  Separating Equilibrium
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