不对称信息下绿色采购激励机制设计

针对供应链采购环节中原材料绿色度隐匿的逆向选择问题, 基于绿色市场需求初显的现实国情, 研究了不对称信息下制造商的激励契约设计过程. 分别探讨了基于一次性转移支付和基于线性分成支付的次优契约的有效性; 将基于线性分成支付的激励契约分为固定契约和弹性契约, 分别提出了实施这两类契约的现实条件, 分析了相关因素对各类收益的影响; 进一步改进弹性契约, 提出了基于纳什协商解的非线性协调契约. 研究表明: 基于线性分成支付的次优契约能有效实现供应商的类型甄别和高效度激励, 非线性协调契约实现了双方收益的帕累托改进和系统整体收益的最优化. 研究结论对绿色供应链的运营实践具有一定的指导意义.

Design of incentive mechanism for green purchasing with asymmetric information

For the adverse selection caused by the concealment of raw materials' green degree in supply chain's purchasing phase, taking the initial stage of green market development as research background, the design of incentive mechanism by the manufacture was studied. The validities of two second-best contracts, the lump-sum transfer contract and the linear shared-saving contract, were discussed respectively. The prerequisites for the implementation of two linear shared-saving contracts, the fixed contract and the flexible contract, were proposed. The influences of certain correlative factors on members' profits were analyzed. By improving the flexible contract, the non-linear coordination contract was given based on the Nash bargaining model. The results indicate that, the linear shared-saving contracts are effective to the type screening and the high-validity motivation, and the non-linear coordination contract achieves the Pareto-improvement of members' profits as well as the optimization of overall profit. The conclusion is instructive to the operation of green supply chain.