| 供应链信息共享效益分配及实证研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 盛方正,季建华.供应链信息共享效益分配及实证研究[J].系统工程与电子技术,2008,30(3):485-488. |
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| 作者姓名： | 盛方正 季建华 |
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| 作者单位： | 上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海,200052 |
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| 摘 要： | 针对由1个供应商,n个零售商组成的二级供应链中的零售商销售量信息共享产生的效益,提出了使用联盟博弈以合理地将其分配的方法。首先求出了信息共享产生的效益,然后通过Shapley值对效益进行分配。考虑了存在和不存在边际效益递减的两种情况。研究发现,存在边际效益递减时,零售商具有更强烈的参与联盟的动机。通过实证说明了结论的有效性。
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| 关 键 词： | 供应链 信息共享 联盟博弈 Shapley值 |
| 文章编号： | 1001-506X(2008)03-0485-04 |
| 修稿时间： | 2007年1月18日 |
Allocation of the profit from information sharing in supply chain with demonstration |
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| SHENG Fang-zheng,JI Jian-hua.Allocation of the profit from information sharing in supply chain with demonstration[J].System Engineering and Electronics,2008,30(3):485-488. |
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| Authors: | SHENG Fang-zheng JI Jian-hua |
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| Abstract: | A method is put forward with alliance game to allocate the value of retailers' sale information among one supplier and n retailers.Firstly,the value of information sharing is shown.Then,the value is allocated by Shapley value.Two kinds of situations with and without decreasing marginal utility are considered. It is found that the retailer has stronger incentive to participate the alliance when the decreasing marginal utility appears.The conclusion is illuminated with a demonstration. |
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| Keywords: | supply chain information sharing alliance game Shapley value |
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