反收购强度与公司控制权防御

本文构建理论模型分析了反收购强度对公司控制权防御的影响与最优反收购强度的选择,并将大股东掏空行为纳入分析框架.首先,在三种不同的反收购决策权归属的情况下,分别考察目标公司的中小股东,代表大股东利益的管理层以及潜在主并企业的三方博弈行为.其次,构建了反收购强度如何影响公司控制权防御的理论模型.最后进行了数值分析,综合阐述了反收购强度对潜在主并企业的出价及目标公司并购概率的影响.主要研究结果表明:1)除开传统文献中提出的谈判收益假说与管理层堑壕假说,反收购条款的控制权防御作用同时也受到目标公司反收购决策主体的影响.2)在三种不同的反收购决策权归属的情况下,主并企业的最优出价均随着反收购强度增加而升高,且随着大股东持股比例增高,最优出价也将会进一步提升.3)反收购强度和反收购决策权的归属是影响并购概率的两种重要因素,当明确反收购归属权时,并购概率随着反收购强度的加强而下降;当目标公司改变反收购归属权时,即使反收购强度增大,并购概率也可能会上升.

Anti-takeover intensity and corporate control defense

This paper analyzes the impact of anti-takeover intensity on corporate control defense and the optimal anti-takeover intensity by establishing a theoretical model, and incorporates the tunneling behavior of controlling shareholders in China into the analysis framework. Firstly, considering three types of decision-making authority in takeover defenses, this study analyzes the behavior of three players, which includes the minority shareholders of target's company, the managers which represent the interests of the controlling shareholder, and the potential acquirers. Secondly, the theoretical model on how the anti-takeover intensity affects corporate control defense is constructed. Subsequently, the numerical analysis comprehensively expounds the impact of the anti-takeover intensity on the potential bid and the takeover probability of the target company. Results indicate the following: 1) In addition to the managerial entrenchment hypothesis and the bargaining hypothesis proposed in the traditional literature, the defense of anti-takeover provisions is also affected by the target company's anti-takeover decision-making rights. 2) In the case of three different anti-takeover decision-making rights, the optimal bid price increases with the enhancement of anti-takeover intensity, and with the increase in shareholding ratio of controlling shareholders the optimal bid will be further improved. 3) Anti-takeover intensity and the attribution of anti-takeover decision-making power are two important factors affecting the probability of takeover. When the attribution of anti-takeover decision-making power is clearly claimed, the probability of takeover decreases with the strengthening of anti-takeover intensity. When the target company changes the anti-takeover ownership, even if the anti-takeover intensity increases, the takeover probability may also rise.