VMCI模式下考虑物流联合外包的供应链合同设计

在供应商管理零售商库存且零售商按产品实际售出量转移支付的VMCI模式下,研究了由供应商、TPL服务商和零售商组成的产运销供应链的合同设计问题.考虑供需双方联合将物流服务外包给TPL、共同承担运费的情形,构建了零售商主导、TPL和供应商跟随的序贯非合作博弈模型,证明了均衡的订购量、物流服务价格和销售努力水平均存在且唯一.研究表明:分散决策下均衡的销售努力水平低于集中决策的情形;若系统边际利润率高于供应商边际利润率,则分散决策下均衡的寄售因子和寄售量均小于集中决策的结果.随后,在零售商和TPL之间引入销售努力成本共担合同,给出了系统实现帕累托改善和获得最大期望收益的参数条件;考虑到VMCI下的寄售因子大小关系不明确,进一步在二者之间构造了具有反等价关系的销售收入共享合同和销售补贴合同,给出了系统实现完美协调和帕累托改善的条件.最后,通过算例验证了上述结论,对物流费用分摊系数和转移支付价格进行了灵敏度分析,并证实了系统在完美协调的基础上实现帕累托改善的可行性.

Contracts design for a supply chain with logistics joint outsourcing under VMCI mode

This paper studies a contracts design problem for a produce-transport-sales supply chain consisting of a supplier, a TPL service provider and a retailer under VMCI mode. It means the supplier manages the retailer's inventory and the retailer transfers payments to the supplier based on the amount of products actually sold. Considering the situation that the supplier and the retailer jointly outsource the logistics service to TPL and bear the logistics service fee together, we build a sequential non-cooperative game model in which the supplier is the leader, the TPL and the retailer are the followers. It is proved that the equilibrium solutions of consignment quality, logistics service price and sales effort are exist and unique. The results show:The equilibrium sales effort under decentralized mode is lower than that under centralized mode; the equilibrium consignment factor and quality under decentralized mode are smaller than the corresponding results under centralized mode when the system's profit margin is higher than the supplier's profit margin. Then, a sales effort cost sharing contract is introduced between the retailer and TPL and the parameter conditions of system realization of Pareto improvement and maximum expected revenue are given. A sales revenue sharing contract and a sales subsidy contract with antiequivalent relation are further constructed between them by considering the size of consignment factor under VMCI is not clear. Then, the conditions for perfect coordination and Pareto improvement of the system are given. Finally, the above conclusions are verified through a calculation example. Besides, the sensitivity analysis of logistics cost allocation coefficient and transfer payment price is made, and the feasibility of the system to achieve Pareto improvement on the basis of perfect coordination is confirmed.