P2P平台信号显示的三方博弈模型研究

针对P2P平台质量参差不齐的现实情况,从双边市场的视角构建P2P平台与借贷双边用户之间的信号显示博弈模型,研究优质P2P平台区别于劣质平台的信号显示行为及其影响因素.研究发现:1)作为信息中介的P2P平台既可能传递信息也可能不传递信息,而传递的信息既可能是真实的也可能是虚假的,其信号显示的有效性依赖于信号显示成本.2)当且仅当信号显示成本居中时,P2P平台愿意真实地显示信号.3)此外,P2P平台传递真实信息的可能性还会受到平台收费,借款人项目特征,投资人资金成本等因素的影响.4)规制部门应针对P2P平台,借款人和投资人三方主体的博弈特点,对平台重点关注低质量项目成功率,资金成本等要素,建立统一的,有公信力背书的信号显示载体,形成政策合力.

The signaling behavior of three-player games on P2P platforms

From the perspective of the two-sided market, we construct a game model among online P2P lending platform (P2P platform), borrowers and lenders, to study the signaling behavioral differences between superior and inferior platforms and its influencing factors. We find that: 1) P2P platforms, as information intermediaries, can convey information, which can be real information as well as false information, or not. The validity of truthfully signaling relies on the signaling costs. 2) P2P platforms are willing to genuinely signal if and only if the signaling costs are at middle-level. 3) Moreover, the possibility of genuine information is influenced by the fees P2P platforms charge to borrowers and lenders, characteristics of projects and financial costs. 4) Therefore, according to the traits of three-player games, the regulator should pay attention to low-quality success rate as well as financial costs, build the credible guarantee on signaling behavioral carrier of P2P platforms and make policy pool efforts.