| 企业激励机制设计与代理成本分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 刘兵,张世英. 企业激励机制设计与代理成本分析[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 2000, 20(6): 50-53. DOI: 10.12011/1000-6788(2000)6-50 |
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| 作者姓名： | 刘兵 张世英 |
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| 作者单位： | 天津大学管理学院 |
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| 摘 要： | 阐述企业激励机制的基本内涵 ,研究探讨了基于代理人的货币需求、闲暇需求和努力程度等因素的最优契约设计 ,分析对称信息与非对称信息条件下的契约差异和代理成本.
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| 关 键 词： | 委托-代理 激励机制 成本分析 非对称信息 契约 |
The Incentive Mechanism Design of Firms and the Analysis of Agency Costs |
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| LIU Bing,ZHANG Shi-ying. The Incentive Mechanism Design of Firms and the Analysis of Agency Costs[J]. Systems Engineering —Theory & Practice, 2000, 20(6): 50-53. DOI: 10.12011/1000-6788(2000)6-50 |
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| Authors: | LIU Bing ZHANG Shi-ying |
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| Affiliation: | School of Management, Tianjin University |
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| Abstract: | This paper studies the optimal contracts design based on the agent's requisition for monetary and rest, and the degree of the agent's work. The agency costs and the discriepancy of the contracts between incomplete information and asymmetric information are discussed in this article. |
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| Keywords: | principal-agency incentive mechanism cost analysis asymmetric information contract |
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