| 基于进化博弈论研究一类监察博弈 |
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| 引用本文： | 邱中华,金栩.基于进化博弈论研究一类监察博弈[J].南京邮电大学学报(自然科学版),2006,26(5):46-49. |
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| 作者姓名： | 邱中华 金栩 |
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| 作者单位： | 南京邮电大学,数理学院,江苏,南京,210003 |
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| 摘 要： | 进化博弈论是把博弈理论分析和动态演化过程分析结合起来的一种理论，基于进化博弈论分析一个监察博弈模型，通过复制动态方程的动态趋势及稳定性分析及基于雅可比矩阵的局部稳定分析法对监察博弈模型进行讨论，分析结果表明，该监察博弈模型的委托人和代理人在委托代理过程中行为策略的自发演化过程的所有均衡点都是鞍点，没有进化稳定策略。
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| 关 键 词： | 监察博弈 进化稳定策略 复制动态 |
| 文章编号： | 1673-5439（2006）05-0046-04 |
| 收稿时间： | 2006-03-15 |
| 修稿时间： | 2006年3月15日 |
Study on a Supervisory Game Based on Evolutionary Game Theory |
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| QIU Zhong-hua,JIN Xu.Study on a Supervisory Game Based on Evolutionary Game Theory[J].Journal of Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications,2006,26(5):46-49. |
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| Authors: | QIU Zhong-hua JIN Xu |
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| Institution: | College of Mathematics and Physics, Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Nanjing 210003,China |
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| Abstract: | The evolutionary game theory combines the game theory with dynamic analysis. In this paper, a supervisory game model is analyzed based on evolutionary game theory. The model is discussed by replicating the dynamic tendency, analyzing the stability of the dynamic equation, and studying a local statble approcach based on the Jacobean matrix. A detailed analysis shows that all equilibrium points are saddle points, and there is no evolutionary stable strategy in the supervisory game. |
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| Keywords: | Supervisory game Evolutionary stable strategy Replicator dynamics |
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