考虑风险偏好的Stackelberg博弈模型及其在PPP项目中的数值求解

研究考虑风险偏好的Stackelberg博弈模型和均衡策略,针对公私合作制(PPP)项目补偿决策问题,根据前后补偿的特点,建立相应的补偿策略数学模型.分别进行集中决策和分散决策分析,得出PPP项目的最优补偿方案.通过数值分析比较和分析私人风险厌恶对于PPP补偿机制的影响.研究表明:私人投资者风险厌恶会导致政府方补偿成本增加,期望收益减少;私人投资者风险厌恶程度会影响补偿的配置方式,厌恶程度越低越倾向单一补偿,厌恶程度越高越倾向混合补偿.

Stackelberg Game Model with Risk Preference and Numerical Solving in the PPP Project Problem

Based on the game theory and risk preference, the Stackelberg game model and equilibrium strategy are established on decision-making problem for government compensation in public-private partnerships(PPP)project. After centralization and decentralization decision analysis, the optimal plan is obtained. Research results show that the compensation cost and the optimal scale of investment considering the risk preference are more than the risk-neutral hypothesis and the effects on the government’s expected revenue are contrary. The research results also show the degree of the private’s risk-aversion will affect the configuration mode of the government compensation.