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关于我国跨区环境保育问题的博弈分析
引用本文:李国平;刘治国.关于我国跨区环境保育问题的博弈分析[J].系统工程理论与实践,2006,26(7):124-128.
作者姓名:李国平;刘治国
作者单位:西安交通大学经济与金融学院国际贸易系 陕西西安710061
基金项目:国家高技术研究发展计划(863计划)
摘    要:环境保育的公共产品特性使得我国退耕还林、退牧还草、退田还湖等跨区域环境保育所产生的成本和效益由不同的地区承担和享受,加剧了区域发展的不平衡和区际间利益冲突,跨区域环境保育已成为我国可持续发展的瓶颈之一.通过建立博弈模型发现,当区域收入不均衡的时候,提供环境保育的纳什均衡结果也不相同,高收入者会承担环境保育的责任,而低收入者则会坐享环境保育的效益,我国应当建立跨区环境补偿的机制,由非环境保育地区补偿环境保育地区的环境保育成本.

关 键 词:环境保育  环境补偿  外部性  博弈分析
文章编号:1000-6788(2006)07-0124-05
修稿时间:2005年6月9日

An Game Analysis on Inter-regional Environmental Conservation in China
LI Guo-ping,LIU Zhi-guo.An Game Analysis on Inter-regional Environmental Conservation in China[J].Systems Engineering —Theory & Practice,2006,26(7):124-128.
Authors:LI Guo-ping  LIU Zhi-guo
Abstract:Since it has the characteristic of public goods,the costs and benefits of environmental conservation,such as returning crop plots to forests,returning pasturage to grass and returning plowland to lake are undertaken by different regions. As this aggravates the inequity and benefit conflicts between regions,inter-regional environmental conservation has become the bottle neck of sustainable development in our country.By using a game model we found that the region with high income will respond in the environmental conservation and the region with low income will reap where he has not sown.So the conclusion is that we should raise people's income in environmental conservation and establish inter-regional environmental compensation mechanism to solve the embarrassment of inter-regional environmental conservation in our country.
Keywords:environmental conservation  environmental compensation  externalities  game analysis
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