线下体验与供应链分销合同的相互作用

本研究针对日益流行的线下体验,考察了由单个制造商和单个电子零售商组成的二级供应链系统,运用消费者效用理论建立了需求函数。在EB和基准情形下,分别利用主从对策原理求得批发价合同与代理销售合同下的均衡解,比较分析出消费者效用最大化时满足制造商与电子零售商双赢的条件。通过情形比较发现：制造商在一定条件下可以实现EB情形下的利润更高,而电子零售商始终在基准情形下利润更高。进一步通过合同比较发现,代理销售合同始终优于批发价合同。因此,在代理销售合同下进行机制设计,能够实现电子零售商在开设线下体验店时与制造商共赢。

The Interaction between Offline Experience and Supply Chain Distribution Contracts

In view of the increasingly popular offline experience, a supply secondary chain system composed of a single manufacturer and a single e-tailer was considered, and the consumer utility theory was used to establish a demand function. In the EB and benchmark situations, the principle of master-slave countermeasures was used to obtain the equilibrium solution under the wholesale price contract and the agency selling contract, the conditions which can meet a win-win situation for the manufacturer and the electronic retailer when the consumer''s utility is maximized was obtained by comparison and analysis. The results show that the manufacturer can realize that the profit in EB case is greater than the profit in benchmark case under certain conditions under the wholesale price contract and the agency selling contract. However, the electronic retailer will not choose to open an offline experience store no matter what kind of contract is adopted. Furthermore, it was found that the agency selling contract is always better than the wholesale price contract either in EB case or in benchmark case. Therefore, design of a mechanism under the agency selling contract can meet the maximum utility of consumers and achieve a win-win situation for the manufacturer and the e-tailer.