| 基于批发价格契约的质量成本审查模型分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 张煜,汪寿阳.基于批发价格契约的质量成本审查模型分析[J].系统工程理论与实践,2011,31(8):1481-1488. |
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| 作者姓名： | 张煜 汪寿阳 |
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| 作者单位： | 1．北京航空航天大学 经济管理学院, 北京100191;
2．中国科学院 数学与系统科学研究院, 北京 100190 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金(70731003) |
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| 摘 要： | 研究了供应链中上下游企业间关于质量成本信息的不对称现象, 并由此可能产生的谎报问题. 建立了以批发价格契约为基础, 同时引入第三方质量成本审查策略的契约机制. 结果表明: 新的契约形式不但可以消除不对称信息的影响, 而且通过审查策略对谎报质量成本信息现象进行了有效的抑制. 下游企业可以通过合理的提高批发价格, 激励上游企业增加质量成本投入, 得到相应较高质量水平的产品, 对生产有正向激励作用. 最后通过算例验证了相关结论.
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| 关 键 词： | 供应链 批发价格契约 质量成本 审查 不对称信息 |
| 收稿时间： | 2009-09-29 |
Analysis of quality cost audit model based on wholesale price contract |
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| ZHANG Yu,WANG Shou-yang.Analysis of quality cost audit model based on wholesale price contract[J].Systems Engineering —Theory & Practice,2011,31(8):1481-1488. |
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| Authors: | ZHANG Yu WANG Shou-yang |
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| Institution: | 1. School of Economics and Management, Beihang University, Beijing 100191, China;
2. Academy of Mathematics and Systems Science, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190, China |
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| Abstract: | In this paper,the asymmetric information between enterprises in supply chain and the resulting effect of cheating on quality cost are studied.Based on wholesale price contract a stylized contract menu is presented using third party quality cost audit strategy to establish an effective incentive mechanism.The conclusions demonstrate that the new contract can not only eliminate the effect of asymmetric quality cost information but also restrain the upstream enterprise from cheating on the quality cost.The dow... |
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| Keywords: | supply chain wholesale price contract quality cost audit asymmetric information |
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