| 基于动态博弈的员工培训风险控制条件透析 |
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| 引用本文： | 钟高峥.基于动态博弈的员工培训风险控制条件透析[J].吉首大学学报(自然科学版),2009,30(4):113-116. |
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| 作者姓名： | 钟高峥 |
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| 作者单位： | (吉首大学商学院，湖南 吉首 416000) |
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| 摘 要： | 从动态博弈视角看，员工培训的风险主要表现在受训后员工的市场价值增加而可能出现的离任与企业利益受损的冲突，因而企业对员工培训的风险控制条件应是谋求企业培训和员工留任的动态利益均衡.
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| 关 键 词： | 员工培训 风险控制 动态博弈 博弈树 |
Condition Analysis of Training Risk Control Based on Dynamic Game |
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| ZHONG Gao-zheng.Condition Analysis of Training Risk Control Based on Dynamic Game[J].Journal of Jishou University(Natural Science Edition),2009,30(4):113-116. |
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| Authors: | ZHONG Gao-zheng |
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| Institution: | （College of Business,Jishou University,Jishou 416000,Hunan China） |
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| Abstract: | From the perspective of dynamic game,staff training risk mainly lies in the contradiction between the enterprises interest loss and the staff resignation due to their market value increase after training.Therefore,staff training risk control must aim at striving for the dynamic balance between staff training and staff retention. |
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| Keywords: | staff training risk control dynamic game game tree |
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