| 非对称谈判能力对双边投资激励的影响 |
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| 引用本文： | 余小川,季建华,邵晓峰.非对称谈判能力对双边投资激励的影响[J].系统管理学报,2007,16(1):1-5. |
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| 作者姓名： | 余小川 季建华 邵晓峰 |
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| 作者单位： | 上海交通大学,安泰经济与管理学院,上海,200052 |
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| 基金项目： | 教育部人文社会科学研究项目;国家自然科学基金 |
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| 摘 要： | 由于企业合作中双方谈判力量的不同,导致双方在合作剩余中的分配份额是非对称的,而分配份额直接决定了投资激励的大小。研究了企业合作中不同谈判力量对比对合作收益分配模式的影响,并通过建立一般的数学模型研究不同支付模式下双方的最优投资,通过与社会最优投资进行比较,分析收益分配方式对双边投资激励造成的影响及其原因。
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| 关 键 词： | 企业合作 谈判力量 投资激励 专用性投资 |
| 文章编号： | 1005-2542(2007)01-0001-05 |
| 修稿时间： | 2005年7月6日 |
The Influence of Bilateral Investment Incentive by the Unsymmetrical Bargaining Power |
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| YU Xiao-chuan,JI Jian-hua,SHAO Xiao-feng.The Influence of Bilateral Investment Incentive by the Unsymmetrical Bargaining Power[J].Systems Engineering Theory·Methodology·Applications,2007,16(1):1-5. |
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| Authors: | YU Xiao-chuan JI Jian-hua SHAO Xiao-feng |
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| Abstract: | Because the collaboration enterprises had different bargaining power,the allocation shares of the collaboration surplus were unsymmetrical.So the bilateral investments in the collaboration were influenced by the bargaining power dejectedly.The paper studied how the bargaining power influenced the collaboration allocation modes in collaboration contract.And then studied the optimization of the bilateral investment incentive through setting up general mathematic models.By comparing with the social optimization investment,the paper also studied the disadvantages of different modes and the causation. |
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| Keywords: | enterprise collaboration bargaining power investment incentive specific investment |
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