一类产品质量甄别最优契约设计

为了甄别产品质量信息,以产品试用期T为决策变量,从买者的角度出发,设计了一个满足参与约束与激励相容约束的交易契约。现实中生产高质量产品的那些企业会接受该机制,生产低质量产品的企业会退出交易而不会以次充好,模仿高质量企业,因为那样做无利可图。该契约还可保证非对称信息下买卖双方交易的总期望剩余较对称信息情况没有改变,并且它全部被买者获得,卖者期望利润为零。

Optimal Contract Design in Screening for Product Quality

The model designs a trade contract which meets participation constraint and incentive compatibility constraint to screen the product quality from the buyer point of view,taking time(T) for product probation as the decision-making variable.Enterprises with high-quality products will accept the mechanism,and the enterprises with low-quality will quit and fail to follow it because in that way they will gain no profit at all.The contract guarantees that the trade expected surplus is made no change in the asymmetric information with the symmetry information and the buyer will gain all but the seller expected profit is gained nothing.