信息不对称下企业并购信号传递博弈模型研究

根据企业并购中的信息不对称现象,结合不完全信息动态博弈及信息经济学的有关理论,建立了目标企业与并购企业之间的信号传递博弈模型,并进行了实例分析,结果表明,目标企业所发出的信号能够反映出目标企业的真实质量,尽管并购企业不能直接观察到目标企业的价值,但可以通过观测目标企业发出的信号来判断目标企业的预期价值水平,并据此作出正确的并购行为.

The Signaling Game Model of Merger and Acquisition Under Asymmertic Information

Focusing on the asymmetric information in the merger and acquisition,by applying the methodologies of incomlete information dynamic games and information economics,a signaling game model between the acquiring firm and the acquired firm is given and a case analysis is conducted The study shows that the signal can reveal the true value of the acquired firm,and the acquiring firm can deduce the future value of the acquired firm and response to its M&A exactly according to the signal,though it cannot observe the future value of the acquired firm directly.