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面向群体性事件的三方两两博弈演化模型
引用本文:李慧,邵荃.面向群体性事件的三方两两博弈演化模型[J].科学技术与工程,2023,23(23):10147-10151.
作者姓名:李慧  邵荃
作者单位:南京航空航天大学;南京航空航天大学民航学院
基金项目:国家自然科学基金(71874081);江苏省自然科学基金(BK20201296);中央高校基本科研业务费(NS2022065)
摘    要:为更好地应对航班延误引发的群体性事件,以机场、旅客、航空公司为群体性事件的博弈主体,明确各个主体在群体性事件中的策略选择,分析其对于群体性事件的影响机理。并基于演化博弈理论,利用复制动态方程,构建三方两两博弈演化模型,采用三个两方博弈模型对航班延误的旅客群体性事件进行分析。在航空公司与旅客、机场与旅客两个博弈模型中,多数情况下,博弈双方在多次博弈后会调整各自的策略,形成一个循环的闭合博弈圈。在机场与航空公司的博弈模型分析中,引入了契约下的核战略的囚徒困境,并得出结论:博弈双方会同时积极应对旅客群体性事件。

关 键 词:群体性事件  博弈演化  复制动态方程  航班延误
收稿时间:2022/12/15 0:00:00
修稿时间:2023/6/2 0:00:00

Three-party game evolution model for group events
Li Hui,Shao Quan.Three-party game evolution model for group events[J].Science Technology and Engineering,2023,23(23):10147-10151.
Authors:Li Hui  Shao Quan
Abstract:In order to better cope with the mass incidents caused by flight delays, airport, passenger and airline are taken as the game subjects of the mass incidents, their strategic choices in the mass incidents are clarified to analyze their influence mechanism on mass incidents. Then, based on the evolutionary game theory and replication dynamic equation, three two-party game models are constructed to analyze the passenger mass incidents caused by flight delays. In the two game models of airline and passenger, airport and passenger, in most cases, both players will adjust their strategies after several games, forming a circular closed game circle. In the analysis of game model of airport and airline, the prisoner''s dilemma of nuclear strategy under contract is introduced, and the conclusion is drawn that both airport and airline will actively deal with passenger mass incidents at the same time.
Keywords:passenger mass incidents      theory of game evolution      replication dynamic equation      flight delay
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