| 王朝君臣博弈与张良自保智慧 |
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| 引用本文： | 刘凌.王朝君臣博弈与张良自保智慧[J].泰山学院学报,2008,30(2):54-58. |
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| 作者姓名： | 刘凌 |
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| 作者单位： | 泰山学院,中文系,山东,泰安,271021 |
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| 摘 要： | 中国古代高度集权的专制政体，决定了君臣问的主奴关系和互相猜忌，以及君王以诈术和暴力治臣．臣子或以暴力篡弑，或以韬晦之计自保。在刘邦抑功臣的政治恐怖中，谋臣张良，凭借其自保智慧，终得全身留名，幸免于难。其中的惨痛教训，值得建设民主政治关注、反思。
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| 关 键 词： | 专制政体 主奴关系 君臣博弈 自保智慧 |
| 文章编号： | 1672-2590(2008)02-0054-05 |
| 修稿时间： | 2007年11月11 |
Game Theory between the Emperor and the Officers in the Dynasties and the Self-protection Wisdom of the Advisor——Zhangliang |
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| LIU Ling.Game Theory between the Emperor and the Officers in the Dynasties and the Self-protection Wisdom of the Advisor——Zhangliang[J].Journal of Taishan University,2008,30(2):54-58. |
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| Authors: | LIU Ling |
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| Institution: | LIU Ling (Chinese Department of Taishan College, Taian, Shandong, 271021) |
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| Abstract: | The authoritarian monarchy in the ancient Chinese history determined that the relations between the emperor and the offices were of master - servant beth in suspicion, which ended up in killing the officers or the emperors in violence, or the officers trying to self- protect wisely. In the period of Han dynasty when Emperor Liu Bang was in throne, the politics was in great terror; however the advisor- - - Zhangliang succeeded in self- protection. The tragic history means to bring concerns and reconsiderations to the constructions of democratic politics. |
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| Keywords: | Authoritarian monarchy Master- servant relation Game Theory between the Emperor and the Ofricers Self- protection Wisdom |
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