第三方物流服务提供商与客户企业的共享节约合同

客户企业希望最大限度的节约物流费用,但由于第三方物流服务提供商的收入增长依赖于客户企业物流费用的增长,第三方物流服务提供商并没有降低这部分物流费用的意愿.而常见的物流合同不能有效的协调客户企业和第三方物流服务提供商的这一利益冲突.在运用动态博弈模型分析常见物流合同的基础上,设计了一种共享节约合同.运用博弈模型论证了这一合同可以形成一种有效的内在激励机制,可以激励双方共同努力节约物流成本,运用数学模型论证了共享节约合同的一些主要性质,并给出了相应的算例.

Shared-Savings Contracts between a Third Party Logistics Service Provider and a Client Enteprise

The client enterprise wishes to minimize the logistics costs,while the third party logistics service provider(TPLSP)'s income depends on the client enterprise's increasing logistics costs,so the TPLSP would not save the logistics costs.But the usual contracts cannot effectively coordinate the benefit conflicts.Based on the dynamic game model to analyze the usual contracts,a shared-savings contract is designed.And a model of dynamic game demonstrates that this contract can form an effective intrinsic incentive mechanism which can drive TPLSP and the client enterprise to make joint efforts to save the logistics costs.Further more,some main properties of the contract have proved and a relevant example is given.