考虑供应商成本结构的电子逆向拍卖机制设计

通过电子逆向拍卖进行采购是企业和政府降低采购成本的重要手段，然而，不同类型的供应商往往具有不同的成本结构，这制约着电子逆向拍卖机制的成功实施.考虑两类成本结构的供应商，即分销商与生产商，研究了电子逆向拍卖机制设计问题.设计了供应商为提高收益采用的投标策略与采购方为降低成本采用的分配策略，即基本机制，结果表明该机制对分销商类型是有效的.针对基本机制无法达到生产商拍卖过程收敛的情况，提出了基于限量策略的改进机制.改进机制能够实现生产商类型供应商拍卖过程的收敛.基于Matlab的数值模拟证明了所设计机制的有效性.

Mechanism Design of Electronic Reverse Auction Considering Supplier′s Cost Structure

Procurement using electronic reverse auction is an important method for enterprises and government to reduce procurement cost. However， due to the different cost structure of different type supplier， it is difficult to carry out the mechanism of electronic reverse auction successfully. Considering two types of cost structure supplier， i. e. distributor and manufacturer， mechanism design of electronic reverse auction was studied. The basic mechanism was designed at first， which included the bidding strategy of supplier and allocation strategy of purchaser. The result revealed that the basic mechanism was efficient for the auction when the supplier was distributor. After that，taking into account the basic mechanism cannot achieve the convergence of manufacturer auction， an improved mechanism with limited strategy was proposed. The improved mechanism could achieve the convergence of manufacturer auction. Numerical simulation based on Matlab showed the efficiency of proposed mechanisms.