| 产业保护关税抑制与反抑制博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 侯云先,于英川.产业保护关税抑制与反抑制博弈分析[J].上海大学学报(自然科学版),2001,7(6):555-559. |
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| 作者姓名： | 侯云先 于英川 |
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| 作者单位： | 上海大学预测咨询研究所，上海 200072 |
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| 摘 要： | 该文在分析刺激走私的因素及走私对产业保护关税的抑制作用的基础上，建立了抑制与反抑制－海关与走私商的博弈，并对博弈均衡进行了分析，据此提出减少走私的建设性意见。
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| 关 键 词： | 产业保护关税 走私 纳什均衡 关税管理机制 抑制 反抑制 博弈分析 |
| 文章编号： | 1007-2861(2001)06-0555-05 |
| 修稿时间： | 2001年5月14日 |
Analysis of Game Model between Custom and Smuggler in Industry Protection |
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| HOU Yun xian,YU Ying chuan.Analysis of Game Model between Custom and Smuggler in Industry Protection[J].Journal of Shanghai University(Natural Science),2001,7(6):555-559. |
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| Authors: | HOU Yun xian YU Ying chuan |
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| Abstract: | Based on analysis of smuggling and its harmfulness, the game of complete information model between custom and smugglers is first set up, and the solution of blend Nash equilibrium derived. In the blend Nash equilibrium, the impacts on tariff, anti smuggling cost and probability, punishment effect, etc are discussed. Finally mechanism of the game is explained. |
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| Keywords: | industry protection tariff smuggling the game Nash equilibrium |
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