需求信息不对称下供需双方的博弈

针对由单供应商和单销售商组成的供应链,提出了供应链双方需求信息对称情况下的激励机制模型,在此基础上建立了供应链双方在需求信息不对称情形下的运作策略博弈模型。该模型在供应商和销售商协商分享供应链利润的条件下,运用激励相容机制使销售商诚实申报需求信息,以便供应链利润最大化同时供应链成员实现双赢。通过冷酷战略原理分析了该激励机制的有效性,并运用仿真实验验证了该激励机制的可行性。

Gaming in supply chain based on asymmetric demand information

An incentive mechanism model with symmetric demand information is proposed for a supply chain that consists of a single supplier and a single retailer.Based on such a symmetric demand information model,a gaming model under two parties having asymmetric demand information is built.This model considers the problem of how the supplier and the retailer who agree on the profit sharing design an incentive mechanism to prevent the retailer from providing false information and to realize the global optimization under an asymmetric demand information environment.The validity of the incentive mechanism with asymmetric demand information is analyzed by using grim strategies.Finally, the feasibility of the model is illustrated by simulation.