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假冒伪劣商品的博弈分析
引用本文:梁彤缨.假冒伪劣商品的博弈分析[J].华南理工大学学报(自然科学版),1997(4):42-45.
作者姓名:梁彤缨
作者单位:华南理工大学工商管理学院
摘    要:本文构造了一个厂商/消费者博弈模型,用于假冒伪劣商品问题的分析,得出丁两种情况下的纳什均衡,并在此基础上提出了建立高额赔偿金制度、降低消费者打假成本、加大反暴利力度等项治理假冒伪劣商品的政策建议。

关 键 词:假冒伪劣商品  博弈  政策

A GAME ANALYSIS OF BASTARDS
Liang Tongying.A GAME ANALYSIS OF BASTARDS[J].Journal of South China University of Technology(Natural Science Edition),1997(4):42-45.
Authors:Liang Tongying
Abstract:In this paper the author constructs a firm consumer game model,which is used to analyze bastards and from which a Nash equilibrium is deduced under two distinctive conditions.Based on this discussion the author makes the following suggestions:(a)A system of high compensation should be set up;(b) In combating bastards,the consumer cost should be decreased;(c) Anti profiteering should be strengthened.
Keywords:bastard  game  policy
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