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具有不完全合作属性的单向流动态网络生成对策
引用本文:吕婷婷,高红伟,李文文,宋琳,于琨. 具有不完全合作属性的单向流动态网络生成对策[J]. 青岛大学学报(自然科学版), 2010, 23(1): 7-12. DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1006-1037.2010.01.002
作者姓名:吕婷婷  高红伟  李文文  宋琳  于琨
作者单位:青岛大学数学科学学院,山东,青岛,266071
基金项目:国家自然科学基金资助项目,山东省研究生教育创新计划项目 
摘    要:通过定义联盟同质费用研究考察具有固定联盟剖分的单向流动态网络生成对策,这区别于同质费用、局中人同质费用的情形。局中人通过采取局部行动生成网络,即每次仅能增加、删除或替换一条指向他的连接,行动的原则是最大化其所在联盟的整体收益。在新的规则之下,通过示例研究了局部纳什网的结构特性及其动态生成过程。选择BG函数作为局中人的基本支付函数,诱导产生联盟-局中人的BG函数,最后根据Myer-son值在联盟内部的局中人之间分派联盟-局中人所获得的收益。

关 键 词:网络生成对策  局部纳什网  联盟-局中人  联盟同质费用  Myerson值

One-way Flow Incomplete Cooperative Dynamic Network Formation Games
LV Ting-ting,GAO Hong-wei,LI Wen-wen,SONG Lin,YU Kun. One-way Flow Incomplete Cooperative Dynamic Network Formation Games[J]. Journal of Qingdao University(Natural Science Edition), 2010, 23(1): 7-12. DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1006-1037.2010.01.002
Authors:LV Ting-ting  GAO Hong-wei  LI Wen-wen  SONG Lin  YU Kun
Affiliation:(College of Mathematics, Qingdao University, Qingdao, 266071)
Abstract:One-way flow dynamic network formation games with fixed coalition partition are studied via defining coalition-homogeneous costs. It is different from the case of homogeneous costs and owner-homogeneous costs. Networks are formed by allowing each agent to take local actions that is to add, remove or replace only one of his own links per turn. The principle of the agents action is to maximize the payoff of his own coalition. Under the new principle the architecture of local Nash network and its dynamic formation process are studied with an example. B~G function is choosen as agents' basic payoff function which induces coalition-agents' B&G function. At last the payoff of the coalition-agent is allocated within the coalition according to Myerson value.
Keywords:network formation games  local Nash networks  coalition-agent  coalition-homogeneous cost  Myerson value
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