供应商股权融资下供应链控制问题的模型分析

供应商股权融资下的供应链控制是企业融资决策与供应链运作管理的有机契合,而股权融资使供应链控制矛盾冲突愈发凸显,因此研究供应商股权融资下的供应链控制问题尤为重要.文章刻画了供应商股权融资下供应链零售与批发定价权重塑的新特征,通过构建供应商股权融资模型,探讨"市场成长性"与"供应链契约结构"如何影响供应链控制策略选择,揭示强弱控制策略对供应商的股权融资额及契约设计影响.核心研究发现是:市场成长性主导了供应商股权融资后对供应链控制策略选择,供应链契约不锁定时应避免采用强供应链控制;当契约锁定时强供应链控制促进了供应商股权融资,而契约不锁定下弱供应链控制促进了供应商股权融资;此外,供应商选择的最优供应链控制策存在"股权融资意愿背驰"现象.

A model analysis on the supply chain control problem based on the equity financing of suppliers

The supply chain control is a combination of corporate finance decision and operation management under the equity financing of suppliers, but the equity financing make the supply chain control conflict more prominent. Therefore, analysing the supply chain control under equity financing is particularly important. This paper depicts the new features of supply chain retail and wholesale pricing power under supplier equity financing. By constructing the supplier equity financing model, this paper discusses how the choice of "market growth" and "contract structure of supply chain" affect supply chain control strategy, reveal the impact of strong and weak control strategies on supplier equity financing and contract design. The key finding is that market growth dominated the selection of supply chain control strategy after the supplier equity financing, unlocked contract should avoid the use of strong supply chain control; When the contract is locked, strong supply chain control promotes the supplier equity financing, the weak supply chain control of unlocked contract promotes the supplier equity financing; Moreover, the optimal supply chain control strategy chosen by the supplier has the phenomenon of "equity financing willingness".