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无限重复流速与拥塞控制博弈实例的应用
引用本文:陶军,吴家皋,刘业.无限重复流速与拥塞控制博弈实例的应用[J].东南大学学报(自然科学版),2005,35(6):853-857.
作者姓名:陶军  吴家皋  刘业
作者单位:1. 东南大学计算机网络和信息集成教育部重点实验室,南京,210096
2. 东南大学计算机科学与工程系,南京,210096
基金项目:科技部科研项目,高等学校博士学科点专项科研项目
摘    要:在讨论了一次博弈模型和流速均衡解析解的基础上,对基于无限重复博弈模型的流速与拥塞控制行为进行了研究.提出了重复和无限重复流速与拥塞控制博弈模型,论证了重复博弈NEP的存在性和最优性,讨论了重复博弈中贴现因子的意义;通过2个无限重复流速控制博弈的实例(2个端系统和N个端系统),介绍了在非合作的流速与拥塞控制中规范(约束)端系统的行为方法,以维护和实现整个流速与拥塞控制系统效用的最优.

关 键 词:无限重复博弈  Nash均衡  效用  流速与拥塞控制
文章编号:1001-0505(2005)06-0853-05
收稿时间:05 10 2005 12:00AM
修稿时间:2005-05-10

Application of examples of infinite repeated flow and congestion control game
Tao Jun,Wu Jiagao,Liu Ye.Application of examples of infinite repeated flow and congestion control game[J].Journal of Southeast University(Natural Science Edition),2005,35(6):853-857.
Authors:Tao Jun  Wu Jiagao  Liu Ye
Institution:1.Key Laboratory of Computer Networks and Information Integration of Ministry of Education, Southeast University, Nanjing 210096, China;2.Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Southeast University, Nanjing 210096, China
Abstract:After the one-shot game model and flow equilibrium solution are discussed,the behaviors of flow and congestion control based on infinite repeated game model further is studied.Subsequently,repeated and infinite repeated flow and congestion control game model is presented.The existence and optimization of the Nash equilibrium point is proved.The discount factor in repeated game is discussed.Finally,through two examples of repeated flow control game with two users and N users,this article explains how to regularize or restrict the(users') behaviors in non-cooperative flow and congestion control respectively to optimize the utility of whole system.
Keywords:infinite repeated game  Nash equilibrium  utility  flow and congestion control
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