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R & D STRATEGIC INVESTMENT IN AN ASYMMETRICAL CASE
作者姓名:Minggao  XUE  Pu  GONG
作者单位:Department of Finance, College of Management, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan 430074, China.
基金项目:This work is supported by Post Doctor Science Foundation of China (2003034479) and Natural Science Foundation of China (70671047).
摘    要:This article analyzes R & D investment decisions in an asymmetrical case. The investment decisions share three important characteristics. First, the investment is completely irreversible. Second, there are two kinds of uncertainties over the future returns from the investment and over technology in R & D process, respectively. Third, there is strategic competition in the asymmetrical case. This article presents the optimal investment threshold values and the optimal investment rule of high-efficient firm (leader), and shows that the investment threshold values are reduced by competition of two firms. Finally, the mixed investment strategies for two firms, the probability that each firm separately exercises the option to invest, and the probability that two firms simultaneously exercise the option are given in the paper.

关 键 词:战略投资  不对称案例  额外工艺  战略竞争
收稿时间:2004-04-09
修稿时间:2004-04-09

R & D Strategic Investment in an Asymmetrical Case
Minggao XUE Pu GONG.R & D Strategic Investment in an Asymmetrical Case[J].Journal of Systems Science and Complexity,2006,19(4):547-557.
Authors:Minggao Xue  Pu Gong
Institution:(1) Department of Finance, College of Management, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan, 430074, China
Abstract:This article analyzes R & D investment decisions in an asymmetrical case. The investment decisions share three important characteristics. First, the investment is completely irreversible. Second, there are two kinds of uncertainties over the future returns from the investment and over technology in R & D process, respectively. Third, there is strategic competition in the asymmetrical case. This article presents the optimal investment threshold values and the optimal investment rule of high-efficient firm (leader), and shows that the investment threshold values are reduced by competition of two firms. Finally, the mixed investment strategies for two firms, the probability that each firm separately exercises the option to invest, and the probability that two firms simultaneously exercise the option are given in the paper. This work is supported by Post Doctor Science Foundation of China (2003034479) and Natural Science Foundation of China (70671047).
Keywords:Asymmetric information  optimal investment threshold value  option game  preemption the mixed investment strategy  
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