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零售商风险规避下基于联合契约的双渠道供应链库存决策模型
引用本文:朱宝琳,薛林,戢守峰,邱若臻.零售商风险规避下基于联合契约的双渠道供应链库存决策模型[J].系统管理学报,2022,31(2):217-229.
作者姓名:朱宝琳  薛林  戢守峰  邱若臻
作者单位:东北大学 工商管理学院,沈阳 110167
基金项目:国家自然科学基金资助项目(71971049,71772035)
摘    要:研究了不确定条件下基于零售商风险规避的双渠道供应链库存协调问题,建立了零售商风险规避下双渠道供应链分散和集中情况下库存最优决策模型,证明了包含收益共享和回购契约的联合契约可以实现双渠道供应链的库存协调,分析了产需不确定因子、风险规避因子和市场分配比例系数对制造商和零售商的最优决策的影响。研完表明,包含收益共享和回购契约的联合契约可实现双渠道供应链的帕累托改进。最后,讨论了联合契约实现帕累托改进的可行范围。数值算例验证了模型和方法的有效性。

关 键 词:双渠道供应链  库存管理  CVaR  联合契约  

A Dual-channel Supply Chain Inventory Decision Model Based on Joint Contract with A Risk-averse Retailer
ZHU Baolin,XUE Lin,JI Shoufeng,QIU Ruozhen.A Dual-channel Supply Chain Inventory Decision Model Based on Joint Contract with A Risk-averse Retailer[J].Systems Engineering Theory·Methodology·Applications,2022,31(2):217-229.
Authors:ZHU Baolin  XUE Lin  JI Shoufeng  QIU Ruozhen
Institution:School of  Business Administration,Northeastern University,Shenyang 110167,China
Abstract:In this paper, the issue of inventory coordination concerning the dual-channel supply chain for a risk-averse retailer under uncertain conditions is studied The optimal inventory decision models under the centralized and decentralized conditions for dual-channel supply chain considering the risk-averse retailer are established and the joint contract including revenue sharing and buyback contract is proven to achieve an inventory coordination in the dual-channel supply chain. The influences of the uncertain factors of yield and demand, the risk aversion factor, and the market allocation ratio on the optimal decisions of manufacturers and retailers are analyzed. It is shown that the joint contract including revenue sharing and buyback contract can achieve Pareto improvement of the dual-channel supply chain. Finally, the feasible scope of Pareto improvement of the joint contract is discussed. Numerical examples verify the effectiveness of the model and method.
Keywords:dual-channel supply  inventory management  CVaR (conditional value at risk)  joint contract  
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