存在无智能电表用户的实时定价研究

研究了智能电网普及应用过程中同时存在有智能电表用户和无智能电表用户的实时定价问题。首先考虑供电商在保证电网稳定运行及自身的经济效益的同时要兼顾两类用户效用。然后建立无智能电表用户的用电规划函数和无智能电表用户群体的福利函数,并提出一主多从的斯塔克尔伯格博弈模型。最后将该模型运用在供电商原有的两种定价机制上,通过数值模拟得出均衡解并通过模型对比验证模型的合理性。结果表明,该博弈模型可有效地对无智能电表用户群体进行需求侧管理,既满足了削峰填谷的目的,又最大化地实现社会福利,同时可以更好地处理突增用电需求的情况,稳定电网的同时提高用户效用,以更符合我国国情。

Real-time pricing of customers without smart meters

Optimal dynamic pricing for mixed customers with and without smart meters was studied under the background of the smart grid popularization and application. First, the power supplier took into account the utility of two types of users while ensuring the stable operation of the power grid and their own economic benefits. Then, a power consumption planning function and welfare function of users without smart meters were established, and a Stackelberg game model with one master and multiple slaves was proposed. Finally, the model was applied to the original two pricing mechanisms of power suppliers, and the equilibrium solution was obtained by numerical simulation, and the rationality of the model was verified by comparative experiments. It is verified that the game model can effectively carry out demand side management for users without smart meters, which can not only cut peak and fill valley, but also maximize social welfare. At the same time, it can better deal with sudden increase of power demand than previous relevant research, stabilize the power grid and improve the user utility, which is more in line with China''s national conditions.