管理者偏度偏好与企业并购绩效

研究发现，A股公司管理者在并购活动中表现出偏度偏好，过度追捧有小概率获取极高收益、即收益分布正偏的“彩票”型并购标的。并购标的的预期收益偏度越大，管理者为其支付的并购溢价越高，而这一非理性行为显著损害其并购绩效；这一效应在非国有企业、机构持股比例低、以及总部所在省份博彩氛围更浓的主并公司中更强，且在考虑管理者的过度自信偏差、以及替换主要变量度量方式时依然稳健。研究结果有助于从偏度偏好的视角揭示管理者并购决策中的非理性因素，丰富偏度偏好影响管理者公司财务决策的研究，并进一步理解文化因素对并购绩效等资本市场产出的影响。

Managers’ Skewness Preference and Merger and Acquisition Performance

This study finds that managers of Chinese listed firms exhibit the skewness preference in merger and acquisition activities, that is, they prefer merger and acquisition targets with lottery-like payoffs. They pay significantly larger premiums for merger and acquisition targets with more skewed payoff distributions, which, in turn, leads to a lower stock market or accounting merger and acquisition performance. This effect is more pronounced for non-SOE acquirers, for acquirers with a lower institutional ownership, and for acquirers whose headquarters are located in provinces where gambling norms are more prevalent. This effect is robust when managerial overconfidence is controlled and alternative measurements of main variables are used. This paper reveals the impact of managers’ irrational behavior biases on their merger and acquisition decisions and performance from the perspective of skewness preference. It also enriches the studies on how managers’ skewness preference affects their corporate finance decisions, and how cultural norms affect capital market outcomes such as merger and acquisition performance.