储备偏好影响下中国与欧盟天然气进口博弈

中国目前是世界第一大天然气进口国，但与欧盟相比，其天然气储备水平很低。为了应对各种不确定性以保障天然气的稳定供应，中国天然气储备水平未来将会有明显提升。天然气储备水平的变化将引起天然气进口需求的变化，进而通过中俄管道天然气的贯通影响欧盟天然气的进口策略。旨在从理论上分析中国天然气储备偏好变化对不同信息结构下天然气进口博弈的潜在影响。研究表明，当只有中国调整储备偏好时，中国在同时博弈中所获得的利润可以达到在主从博弈中主者的利润水平，此时欧盟的利益会受到损害；而当中国和欧盟均可以调整储备偏好时，中国和欧盟的均衡利润可能因为过度储备反而降低，俄罗斯则可能因此而获得更多的生产者剩余。本文还对天然气进口均衡价格、均衡进口量、利润水平等进行了定量分析，同时，利用天然气市场相关数据检验了本文结论的有效性和稳定性。

Game of Natural Gas Import Between China and EU Under the Influence of Reserve Preferences

China is currently the largest importer of natural gas in the world, but its gas reserves are relatively low compared with the European Union (EU). The gas reserves in China will rise significantly in the near future in response to uncertainties to ensure a reliable gas supply. A change of natural gas reserve level will cause a change of natural gas market demand, which will affect the strategy of the natural gas import in the EU after PNG is connected from Russia to China. The purpose of this paper is to theoretically analyze the potential influence of the change of natural gas reserve preference in China on the natural gas import game in different information structures. The research shows that only when China adjusts its reserve preference, can its benefit in a simultaneous game reach that of the leader in a Stackelberg game, and will the benefit of the EU be damaged in this case. When both China and the EU can adjust their reserve preferences, each equilibrium profit may be reduced by excessive reserves, but Russia may thus obtain more producer surplus. This paper also studies the quantitative property of the equilibrium price, the equilibrium import quantity, and the profit level. At the same time, it tested the validity and stability of the conclusions by using the relevant data of the natural gas market.