信号博弈均衡结果的唯一性及其算法

研究一类满足直观标准的信号博弈，这类博弈存在唯一的精练贝叶斯均衡结果。首先，本文描述了信号博弈模型，给出了均衡定义和几个基本假设；然后，证明了三个基本定理，在这三个基本定理的基础上，证明了信号博弈有唯一的均衡结果的充分性定理，事实上，证明这一主要定理的过程给出了求解均衡结果的方法；最后，给出了均衡结果的算法，并举例说明唯一均衡结果的算法。

Algorithm and uniqueness of the equilibrium outcome of signaling game

This paper studies a class of signaling games in which a uniquely perfect Bayesi an Nash equilibrium outcome satisfying intuitive criterion exists. First of all, the paper describes the models of signaling games in which the definition o f th e equilibrium and some basic assumptions are given. Secondly, it shows three bas ic theorems used to show the main theorem giving sufficient conditions under whi ch the signaling games have unique outcomes. In fact, the process that shows the main theorem gives the method solving the equilibrium outcome. Finally, the alg orithm solving the equilibrium outcome is given and an example is given to illus trate the algorithm of the unique equilibrium outcome.