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考虑零售商公平偏好的促销努力激励机制设计
引用本文:浦徐进,龚磊,张兴. 考虑零售商公平偏好的促销努力激励机制设计[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 2015, 35(9): 2271-2279. DOI: 10.12011/1000-6788(2015)9-2271
作者姓名:浦徐进  龚磊  张兴
作者单位:1. 江南大学 商学院, 无锡 214122;2. 江苏食品安全研究基地, 无锡 214122
基金项目:国家自然科学基金(71371086);江南大学自主科研计划重点项目(JUSRP51416B);国家自然科学基金青年项目(71101032)
摘    要:在制造商主导的二层供应链框架下,考察零售商的公平偏好对于促销努力水平和供应链运作效率的影响,并设计一个基于Nash讨价还价博弈的收益共享契约作为供应链协调机制.研究发现:1)在缺乏协调机制时,制造商可以通过降低批发价格,来维持零售商具有公平偏好的促销努力水平与公平中性时相等;2)零售商的公平偏好有利于提高自身的效用水平,但会降低制造商和供应链整体的效用水平;3)合理的收益共享契约可以实现双方效用水平Pareto改进,改善供应链运作效率.最后用数值仿真验证了该收益共享契约作为协调机制的可行性.

关 键 词:供应链管理  促销努力  公平偏好  Nash 讨价还价博弈  协调机制  
收稿时间:2014-05-05

The incentive mechanism design for promotion effort considering the retailer's fairness preference
PU Xu-jin,GONG Lei,ZHANG Xing. The incentive mechanism design for promotion effort considering the retailer's fairness preference[J]. Systems Engineering —Theory & Practice, 2015, 35(9): 2271-2279. DOI: 10.12011/1000-6788(2015)9-2271
Authors:PU Xu-jin  GONG Lei  ZHANG Xing
Affiliation:1. Business School, Jiangnan University, Wuxi 214122, China;2. Jiangsu Food Safety Research Base, Wuxi 214122, China
Abstract:This paper investigates the influence of fairness preference on the promotion effort and supply chain' efficiency in the two-stage supply chain where the manufacture is the leader. A revenue sharing contract based on Nash bargaining model is designed to coordinate the whole supply chain. The results show that: 1) When the absence of coordination mechanism, the manufacture has to reduce the wholesale price to ensure the same promotion effort level considering the retailer's fairness preference; 2) The retailer' fairness preference can improve its utility level, but will reduce the utility level of manufacturer and the whole supply chain; 3) The reasonable revenue sharing contract can lead to a Pareto improvement of the efficiency of the whole supply chain. Finally, the numerical simulation is performed to prove the feasibility of the revenue sharing contract as a coordination mechanism.
Keywords:supply chain management  promotional effort  fairness preference  Nash bargaining  coordination mechanism
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