非对称供应成本信息下装配系统定价与供货策略研究

本文考虑一个单制造商和两个互补性供应商所构成的装配系统,当市场需求随机时,制造商采取供应商管理库存的方式来转移零部件的库存风险并决定零部件的批发价格,两供应商需要在市场需求真正到来之前自行决定各自的零部件生产量,并承担相应的库存风险.本文假定供应商存在高成本和低成本两个类型,利用斯坦伯格博弈和纳什均衡研究了当供应商生产成本信息不对称和对称这两种状态下的生产与定价决策,分析供应商成本信息共享的价值.研究表明,高成本供应商在信息对称时的均衡收益大于信息不对称时的均衡收益,愿意共享信息,而低成本供应商在信息不对称时的均衡收益更大,并不会自愿共享成本信息;供应商成本信息共享对制造商和供应链也是有利的.

Research on pricing and supply strategies in assembly system under asymmetric cost information

In an assembly system consisting of a manufacturer and two complementary suppliers, with random demand, the manufacturer adopts vendor managed inventory to transfer inventory risk and decide the wholesale price of components, the two suppliers have to decide their production before the market demand comes and undertake corresponding inventory risk. In this paper, based on the assumption that there are high cost type and low cost type for each supplier, we use Steinberg game and Nash equilibrium to study the production and pricing strategies under two conditions of asymmetry supplier production cost information and symmetry supplier production cost information, and analyse the value of supplier cost information sharing. The research results indicate that, supplier of high cost obtains more profits when information is symmetric and is willing to join the cost information sharing system, whereas supplier of low cost obtains more profits when information is asymmetric and will not join the cost information sharing system voluntarily. It is also beneficial for the manufacturer and supply chain when supplier production cost information is shared.