基于双重成本控制标准作用的委托-代理模型

按照泰勒控制标准理论设立的成本控制标准具有单层次特征,不利于提高企业成本控制效度.人的理性、情感和认知的变化,使双重成本控制标准应运而生.管理者不仅要制定双重成本控制标准,而且要通过制定合理的激励契约来激励工人积极控制成本,而工人在执行双重成本控制标准过程中,为实现自身利益的最大化,将根据掌握的信息选择自身努力程度,于是产生了工人与管理者之间的动态博弈.通过建立基于双重成本控制标准作用的委托-代理模型,分析管理者差异化激励契约对工人努力程度的影响,可以发现工人努力程度与所受到的激励程度呈正相关.对于达到不同成本控制标准的工人,管理者应设定差异化激励系数,实现成本控制人本化管理.

Principal-agent model based on dual cost control standards effect

Cost control standards established by Taylor's standards setting method have single level characteristics, go against to improve the validity of enterprise cost control. The changes of human's rationality, emotion and cognition make dual cost control standards emerge. Managers not only need to establish double cost control standards but also need to make the reasonable incentive contracts to encourage workers; in order to maximize self-interest, workers select their efforts according to their own information, thus produces a dynamic game between workers and managers. Through the establishment of principal-agent model based on dual cost control standards effect, this paper analyses the effects of the differences of managers incentive contracts on the degrees of workers' effort. It can be found that there is a positive correlation between the degrees of workers' effort and incentive degrees they got, for the workers reach different cost control standards, managers should set different incentive coefficients, to achieve the humanization management of cost control.