基于无标度网络与观点传播动力学的股权拍卖机制设计与仿真研究

在无标度网络上运用观点传播动力学动态地刻画了风险投资退出股权拍卖过程中外部投资者之间的交互影响及其真实估值的动态演进规律,在此基础之上构建了满足激励相容与个体理性条件的股权拍卖模型,Netlogo仿真分析结果表明所设计的股权拍卖机制能够有效地揭示外部投资者的真实信息,风险投资家最终能够以合理的市场出清价格出售其所持有的风险企业股权;外部投资者的初始真实估值分布对股权拍卖的结果具有决定性的影响,宏观市场中风险企业的评价水平对股权拍卖结果的影响则相对较弱,外部投资者的易受影响程度与交互阈值取值的变化不影响外部投资者真实估值分布与风险投资家收益的走势,但会影响拍卖结果的变动幅度.

Research on mechanism design and simulation of equity auction based on scale-free network and dynamics of opinion spread

This paper characterizes outside investors' mutual influence and the dynamic evolutionary rules of their real valuation in the process of venture capital exit equity auction using dynamics of opinion spread on the scale-free network, and establishes an equity auction model that meets the incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraint. Results of Netlogo simulation show that the above-mentioned equity auction mechanism can effictively reveal the real information of outside investors, the venture capitalist can eventually achieve a reasonable market clearing price; the initial distribution of outside investors' real valuation has a decisive influence on the result of equity auction, and the influence of the market assessment of the venture firm is relatively weak, fluctuations of outside investors' susceptible extent and interactive threshold will not affect the tendency of the distribution of outside investors' real valuation and the expected revenue of venture capitalist, but will affect the fluctuating amplitude of the result of equity auction.