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农村小额信用贷款的博弈分析
引用本文:田盈,蒲勇健.农村小额信用贷款的博弈分析[J].重庆大学学报(自然科学版),2002,25(11):59-61.
作者姓名:田盈  蒲勇健
作者单位:重庆大学工商管理学院 重庆400044 (田盈),重庆大学工商管理学院 重庆400044(蒲勇健)
摘    要:小额信用贷款是一种帮助农民脱贫致富的有效手段,农民申请贷款的机会成本、商业银行的再贷款利率以及农民投资项目的成功概率都对这项业务的开展有影响。另外在我国许多地方,当农民不能够按期还贷时,往往还对其进行行政处罚,文章用一个简单的模型,讨论了这些因素与农民获取贷款可能性之间的关系。结果表明,降低农民申请贷款的机会成本与商业银行的再贷款利率,提高农民投资项目的成功概率将有助于农民获取贷款,同时,如果农民不存在恶意欠贷的情况,行政处罚加大了农民获取贷款的难度。

关 键 词:农村  小额信用贷款  博弈分析  行政处罚  显示原理  机会成本  再贷款利率
文章编号:1000-582X(2002)11-0059-03
修稿时间:2002年9月10日

A Game Analysis of Small-loan to Farmer
TIAN Ying,PU Yong jian.A Game Analysis of Small-loan to Farmer[J].Journal of Chongqing University(Natural Science Edition),2002,25(11):59-61.
Authors:TIAN Ying  PU Yong jian
Abstract:Small sum credit is a efficient way to help farmer shake off poverty. The opportunity cost of win the loan, refinancing rat and the probability of success of have effects on the development of this item. In many areas, if the loan can't be paid in time, farmer will be punished. The way has great efficiency on the farmer who owes the loan on purpose. But the effect on the farmer who doesn't owe the loan on purpose of the way hasn't been studied. The relationship between the probability of winning the loan and these factors has been studied by a simple method in this paper. The conclusion is, the decrease in the opportunity cost and refinancing rat, the increase in the probability of success can help farmer win the loan. If there is no outstanding payment on purpose, the punishment has no advantage.
Keywords:small  loan  punishment  revelation principle  game  opportunity cost
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