| 两国产业保护非合作博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 侯云先,林文,于英川. 两国产业保护非合作博弈分析[J]. 上海大学学报(自然科学版), 2002, 8(5): 467-470 |
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| 作者姓名： | 侯云先 林文 于英川 |
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| 作者单位： | 上海大学,预测咨询研究所,上海,200072;中国农业大学,农业工程研究院,北京,100083 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金 (79670 0 10 )资助项目 |
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| 摘 要： | 该文在产业保护的研究背景基础上 ,建立了两阶段动态博弈模型 ,用博弈论方法研究两国与两国产业在谈判贸易保护政策中的均衡 .然后 ,分析了关税、补贴手段对产业内销量和出口量 ,以及对市场价格和市场需求量的影响 .结果表明 ,在文中假设条件下 ,产业的内销量与他国的关税无关 ,产业的出口量与本国的关税也无关 .只有当满足某一特殊条件时 ,本国关税才使本国市场需求扩大 .
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| 关 键 词： | 关税 动态博弈 子博弈精炼均衡 |
| 文章编号： | 1007-2861(2002)05-0467-04 |
| 修稿时间： | 2002-04-19 |
Non-Cooperative Game Analysis on Trade Protection between Two Countries |
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| HOU Yun xian ,LIN Wen ,YU Ying chuan. Non-Cooperative Game Analysis on Trade Protection between Two Countries[J]. Journal of Shanghai University(Natural Science), 2002, 8(5): 467-470 |
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| Authors: | HOU Yun xian LIN Wen YU Ying chuan |
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| Affiliation: | HOU Yun xian 1,LIN Wen 2,YU Ying chuan 1 |
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| Abstract: | This paper first states the background of trade protection. A dynamic game model with four players, viz. two nations and two industries is established. Secondly, by means of converse induction, it gives a sub game perfect equilibrium and then analyzes the effect of tariff and subsides on the equilibrium. It has been found that (1) the sale of domestic market is independent of external tariff, and the export is also independent of native tariff, and (2) native demand can expand with increasing native tariff under the special condition. |
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| Keywords: | tariff dynamic game sub game perfect equilibrium |
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