公共资产配置与预算管理的演化博弈分析

在公共资产配置与预算管理过程中，由于财政部门和预算单位之间存在信息不对称，导致公共资产配置效率和使用效益低下.本文运用演化博弈的理论与方法分析了公共资产配置与预算管理的博弈演化过程，研究了预算管理过程中的声誉激励效应和监督惩罚效应，给出了不同类型预算单位与财政部门之间策略选择的互动机制，重点对静态惩罚机制和动态惩罚机制下博弈均衡进行了比较.研究表明：声誉对高成本的预算单位具有激励作用，监督对低成本的预算单位具有惩罚作用，动态惩罚机制比静态惩罚机制的监督效果更好，监督概率和监督惩罚量越大监督效果越好.

Analysis on the efficient allocation of public assets and budget management based on evolutionary game theory

The asymmetry information between financial sector and budget units can easily lead to inefficient allocation and inefficient utility during the process of public asset allocation and budget management．We analyze the evolution process of asset allocation and budget management and study the incentive effect of reputation and the constraint effect of supervision by using evolutionary game theory and method．We analyze the interaction mechanism between the financial sectors' strategy and the budget units' strategy, and evolutionary equilibriums of financial sector and budget units are compared under static punishment mechanism and dynamic punishment mechanism. Our research finds that the incentive effects of reputation is effective for the high cost of budget unit, and the constraint effect of supervision is effective for low cost budget unit. Dynamic punishment mechanism is better than static punishment mechanism, and the more the amount of punishment, the greater the probability supervision, the better the supervision effect.