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基于讨价还价模型的分享型合同节水管理利益分配
引用本文:王小胜,胡豪,刘欣欣,安笑洁.基于讨价还价模型的分享型合同节水管理利益分配[J].系统工程理论与实践,1981,40(9):2418-2426.
作者姓名:王小胜  胡豪  刘欣欣  安笑洁
作者单位:1. 河北工程大学 数理科学与工程学院, 邯郸 056038;2. 河北工程大学 管理工程与商学院, 邯郸 056038
基金项目:国家自然科学基金(61873084);河北省高等学校科学技术研究重点项目(ZD2017016);河北省研究生创新资助项目(CXZZSS2020077);邯郸市科技支撑计划项目(1534201097-1)
摘    要:针对分享型合同节水管理的利益分配问题,提出了基于讨价还价模型的动态博弈利益分配方案.考虑到出价顺序对博弈均衡结果有着显著影响,以双方分别先出价时的均衡出价作为各自的分配额,对比分配额之和与总"蛋糕"的大小,构建了分情况讨论的利益分配博弈模型.其次,为使分配结果收敛,引入分配差额及消耗因子,在利益分配博弈的基础上,进一步构建了差额分摊博弈模型,使得研究结果更为完善.结果表明:1)参与者的利益分配额与贴现因子、固定成本及消耗因子密切相关;2)当分配额之和不大于总"蛋糕"时,利益分配方案可在利益分配博弈中求解,否则,利益分配方案的求解需要结合利益分配博弈和差额分摊博弈;3)分享型合同节水管理模式下,节水服务公司享有较多节水收益.

关 键 词:讨价还价模型  合同节水管理  利益分配  出价顺序  
收稿时间:2019-07-14

Profit allocation of benefit-sharing water saving management contract based on bargaining model
WANG Xiaosheng,HU Hao,LIU Xinxin,AN Xiaojie.Profit allocation of benefit-sharing water saving management contract based on bargaining model[J].Systems Engineering —Theory & Practice,1981,40(9):2418-2426.
Authors:WANG Xiaosheng  HU Hao  LIU Xinxin  AN Xiaojie
Institution:1. School of Mathematics and Physics, Hebei University of Engineering, Handan 056038, China;2. School of Management Engineering and Business, Hebei University of Engineering, Handan 056038, China
Abstract:Aiming at the benefit distribution problem of benefit-sharing water saving management contract, a dynamic game benefit distribution scheme based on bargaining model is proposed. Considering the bid order has a significant impact on the equilibrium, this paper takes the equilibrium of both parties when they bid first respectively as their respective allocations, then compares the the size of the total "cake" and the sum of allotments, a interest allocation game model discussed by cases is established. Furthermore, to make the distribution result of convergence, introducing the benefit deficiency and consumption factors, on the basis of interest allocation game, the game model of deficiency apportion is further established, which makes the research result more perfect. The result shows that: 1) The benefit distribution of participants is closely related to discount factor, fixed cost and consumption factor; 2) When the sum of allotments is not greater than the total "cake", the benefit distribution scheme can be solved in the interest allocation game, otherwise, the solution of benefit distribution scheme needs to combine interest allocation game and deficiency apportion game; 3) Under the benefit-sharing water saving management contract, water saving service company enjoy more water saving benefits.
Keywords:bargaining model  water saving management contract  profit distribution  bid order  
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