基于强互惠理论的漳河流域跨界水资源冲突水量协调方案设计

水量的分配方案在一定程度上影响因水量短缺引发的跨界水资源冲突的发展进程.从政府强互惠的角度入手，设计水量协调方案，寻求漳河流域跨界水资源冲突的协调途径是一个新的视角.基于这一思想，从政府的强互惠政策角度对漳河流域跨界水资源冲突系 统建模，从经济效益和社会效益两方面建立政府Agent和用水Agent 的目标函数，以强互惠表现的节水激励和水权交易为例，分别建立强互惠下的节水激励模型和水权交易模型，通过粒子 群优化算法求解，得出两种政策下漳河流域跨界水资源冲突的水量协调方案.水量的协调方案表明：政府强互惠的表现——节水激励和水权交易可以重新调整漳河流域的水量分配方案，以此来减少缺水量，协调漳河流域的跨界水资源冲突.

Water resources allocation coordination program design of Zhanghe river basin transboundary water resources conflicts based on strong reciprocity theory

Water distribution program to some extent affects the development process of transboundary water conflicts caused by water shortages. It is a new prospect to seek coordination way of Zhanghe basin transboundary water conflicts from the point of view of strong reciprocity to design water coordination program. Based on this idea, the system model of Zhanghe basin transboundary water resources conflicts through the government's strong reciprocity position is built. According to the economic and social benefits, the objective functions of the government agent and water agent are also built. Taking water-saving incentives and water rights trading as examples, water conservation incentive model and water rights trading model of strong reciprocity are established. Particle swarm optimization algorithm is used to obtain the water resources coordinated program of Zhanghe basin transboundary water resources conflicts. The results reveal: performance of government strong reciprocity——water-saving incentives and water rights trading can re-adjust Zhanghe basin water allocation program in order to reduce the degree of water shortage, coordinated Zhanghe basin transboundary water resources conflicts.