环境群体性事件"信息-权利"协同演化的仿真分析

从"信息传播-利益博弈"的协同演化视角,构建了环境污染群体性突发事件的协同演化博弈模型,然后在NetLogo平台上进行多主体的社会仿真分析.仿真结果表明:环境污染突发事件具有两种协同演化路径,即邻避运动的"协商谈判-信息畅通-相对理性的集体抗议",环境污染群体性事件的"暗箱操作-信息过剩-非理性的集体抗议";在各种收益和信息参数情境下,存在着丰富多样的演化均衡结果;政府施加信息措施的强度作为外部干扰,导致了"演化均衡漂移"现象.地方政府部门既可以通过尊重周边的知情权和参与权采取协商谈判的博弈结构,也可以通过加大信息搜集(或者舆情引导)措施,促使事态朝着周边居民最终接受方案的方向演化.

Information-right co-evolutionary simulation analysis of mass emergency derived from environmental pollution

From the co-evolutionary viewpoint of "information diffusion - right game", the paper builds the co-evolutionary game model of mass emergency derived from environmental pollution, and then makes multi-agent social simulation analysis under the platform of NetLogo. The research results show that mass emergency derived from environmental pollution has two types of co-evolutionary path: one is the "not in my back yard" with "negotiation - unblocked information - rational collective protest", the other is the mass emergency with "black case operate - information overflow - irrational collective protest". Under the different scenarios of payoff and information parameters, there are various results of evolutionary equilibrium. As the exterior disturbance, the degree of information management by local government leads to the phenomenon of "evolutionary equilibrium drift". Local government can not only choose the game structure of negotiation which respects the right to know and participate of nearby residents, but also strengthen the information management, so as to impel the nearby residents to accept the disposal method.