| 不对称信息下应用服务外包招标机制设计 |
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| 引用本文： | 唐国锋,但斌,宋寒.不对称信息下应用服务外包招标机制设计[J].系统管理学报,2011,20(5). |
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| 作者姓名： | 唐国锋 但斌 宋寒 |
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| 作者单位： | 重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆,400044 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金资助项目(70871128) |
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| 摘 要： | 服务能力及经济成本是客户企业选择应用服务提供商(Application Service Provider,ASP)的重要指标.针对服务能力信息不对称下客户企业选择ASP的逆向选择问题,建立了应用服务外包的委托—代理模型,通过模型求解得到了应用服务外包最优招标机制的合约菜单,并对该机制的相关性质进行了分析.研究表明,不对称信息下客户企业主要根据服务能力、经济成本选择ASP,而与服务报价无关;客户企业向ASP支付的服务报酬主要由服务成本及信息租金两部分组成;ASP中标的服务能力较完全信息下中标的服务能力低.
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| 关 键 词： | 应用服务提供商(ASP) 不对称信息 逆向选择 招标机制 |
The Mechanism Design for Application Service Outsourcing Bidding under Asymmetric Information |
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| TANG Guo-feng
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DAN Bin
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SONG Han.The Mechanism Design for Application Service Outsourcing Bidding under Asymmetric Information[J].Systems Engineering Theory·Methodology·Applications,2011,20(5). |
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| Authors: | TANG Guo-feng DAN Bin SONG Han |
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| Institution: | TANG Guo-feng,DAN Bin,SONG Han(School of Economics and Business Administration,Chongqing University,Chongqing 400044,China) |
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| Abstract: | Capability and cost of service are two important indeices for an enterprise to choose Application Service Provider(ASP).For the adverse selection problem under asymmetric on information service capability between the customer enterprise and the ASP,the principle-agent model of application service outsourcing is developed.Based on this model,the contract menu of optimal bidding mechanism is obtained.Additionally,the properties of the proposed mechansim are analyzed.It is shown that the customer enterprise ch... |
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| Keywords: | application service provider(ASP) asymmetric information adverse selection bidding mechanism |
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