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Epistemology of a believing historian: Making sense of Duhem's anti-atomism
Authors:Klodian Coko
Institution:Department of History and Philosophy of Science, Indiana University, Bloomington, USA;Selventa, Inc., One Alewife Brook Parkway, Cambridge, MA 02140, USA;Department of Philosophy, School of Sociology and Philosophy, University College Cork, Cork city, Ireland;School of Humanities and Social Sciences, HSS Philosophy Programme, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore;Philosophy Department, Boston University, Boston, MA, USA;Louisiana State University, Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, 102 Coates Hall, Baton Rouge, LA 70803, USA;Rudolf Peierls Centre for Theoretical Physics, 1 Keble Road, Oxford OX1 3NP, United Kingdom
Abstract:Pierre Duhem's (1861–1916) lifelong opposition to 19th century atomic theories of matter has been traditionally attributed to his conventionalist and/or positivist philosophy of science. Relatively recently, this traditional view position has been challenged by the claim that Duhem's opposition to atomism was due to the precarious state of atomic theories during the beginning of the 20th century. In this paper I present some of the difficulties with both the traditional and the new interpretation of Duhem's opposition to atomism and provide a new framework in which to understand his rejection of atomic hypotheses. I argue that although not positivist, instrumentalist, or conventionalist, Duhem's philosophy of physics was not compatible with belief in unobservable atoms and molecules. The key for understanding Duhem's resistance to atomism during the final phase of his career is the historicist arguments he presented in support of his ideal of physics.
Keywords:Pierre Duhem  Atomism  Realism  Natural classification  Historicism
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