The methodological defense of realism scrutinized |
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Authors: | K Brad Wray |
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Institution: | 1. Department of Mathematics and School of Economics and Management, University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy;2. Department of Economics, Society and Politics, University of Urbino Carlo Bo, Italy;3. Department of Economics, University of Bamberg, Germany |
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Abstract: | I revisit an older defense of scientific realism, the methodological defense, a defense developed by both Popper and Feyerabend. The methodological defense of realism concerns the attitude of scientists, not philosophers of science. The methodological defense is as follows: a commitment to realism leads scientists to pursue the truth, which in turn is apt to put them in a better position to get at the truth. In contrast, anti-realists lack the tenacity required to develop a theory to its fullest. As a consequence, they are less likely to get at the truth.My aim is to show that the methodological defense is flawed. I argue that a commitment to realism does not always benefit science, and that there is reason to believe that a research community with both realists and anti-realists in it may be better suited to advancing science. A case study of the Copernican Revolution in astronomy supports this claim. |
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Keywords: | Anti-realism Methodological defense of realism Feyerabend Popper Copernican revolution Risk spreading |
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