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Collaborative explanation,explanatory roles,and scientific explaining in practice
Authors:Alan C. Love
Affiliation:1. Department of Engineering Science, National Cheng Kung University, No.1, Daxue Rd., East Dist., Tainan City, 701, Taiwan;2. Graduate Institute of Information and Computer Education, National Taiwan Normal University, No. 162, Sec. 1, Heping E. Rd., Da-an District, Taipei City, 10610, Taiwan;1. Montreal Neurological Institute, McGill University, H3A 2B4 Montréal, QC, Canada;2. Department of Neurology and Neurosurgery, McGill University, H3A 2B4 Montréal, QC, Canada;3. Department of Physiology, McGill University, H3A 2B4 Montréal, QC, Canada
Abstract:
Scientific explanation is a perennial topic in philosophy of science, but the literature has fragmented into specialized discussions in different scientific disciplines. An increasing attention to scientific practice by philosophers is (in part) responsible for this fragmentation and has put pressure on criteria of adequacy for philosophical accounts of explanation, usually demanding some form of pluralism. This commentary examines the arguments offered by Fagan and Woody with respect to explanation and understanding in scientific practice. I begin by scrutinizing Fagan's concept of collaborative explanation, highlighting its distinctive advantages and expressing concern about several of its assumptions. Then I analyze Woody's attempt to reorient discussions of scientific explanation around functional considerations, elaborating on the wider implications of this methodological recommendation. I conclude with reflections on synergies and tensions that emerge when the two papers are juxtaposed and how these draw attention to critical issues that confront ongoing philosophical analyses of scientific explanation.
Keywords:Constitution  Explanation  Functional analysis  Mechanisms  Scientific practice
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