基于行政复审与福利最大化的反倾销税率比较 |
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引用本文: | 钟根元,王方华,张周. 基于行政复审与福利最大化的反倾销税率比较[J]. 系统工程学报, 2004, 19(6): 658-660 |
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作者姓名: | 钟根元 王方华 张周 |
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作者单位: | 1. 上海交通大学管理学院,上海,200052 2. 复旦大学管理学院,上海,200433 |
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摘 要: | 根据博弈论及经济学有关原理,在国内外企业处于不完全信息静态博弈的假设条件下,分别推导出依据现行反倾销法律法规规定的计算行政复审反倾销税率的公式以及按照国内社会福利最大化原则的计算行政复审反倾销税率的优化模型.同时,根据经济学有关原理发现现行反倾销税率的计算存在诸多缺陷.最后,建议我国政府及有关国际组织宜采用优化模型来确定反倾销税率。
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关 键 词: | 不完全信息静态博弈 行政复审 反倾销税率 社会福利最大化 |
文章编号: | 1000-5781(2004)06-0658-03 |
Comparison of AD duty rates based on administrative review and social welfare maximum |
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Abstract: | At first, according to the relevant theories of game and economics, the authors derive two different kinds of models to calculate AD(anti_dumping) rate, which are based on current regulations of AD and maximal principle of domestic social welfare respectively under static game of imperfect information. Secondly, the authors make a research about the two models, and conclude that AD rate model based on current regulations of AD has several shortages. At last, the authors suggest our country and WTO to use optimal model to calculate AD rate. |
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Keywords: | incomplete information static game administrative review AD duty rate social welfare maximum |
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