价格规制下医疗市场竞争的福利效应分析

为分析医疗服务市场中竞争对医疗服务质量和社会福利的影响，构建了患者就医选择、医院投资策略和整体社会福利模型，进而分析了不同状态下的均衡模型.结果表明：引入竞争而使医疗服务质量提高的前提条件为市场中重症患者份额低于某个拐点；引入竞争对社会福利的影响，则取决于对医疗服务的补偿水平和市场中重症患者比例，即当对医疗服务的补偿水平较高，且重症患者比例足够高时，或者当医疗服务的补偿水平较低，且重症患者比例足够低时，医院之间的竞争将会提高社会福利.最后，结合我国当前医疗卫生服务体系存在的问题，就实现福利最大化提出了相应的政策建议.

Welfare Effect of Competition in Medical Market under Regulated Price

In order to analyze the effect of competition on the healthcare quality and social welfare, this paper constructed the patients’ and hospitals’ behavior model and social welfare model. By means of analysis and comparision between the equilibrium models under different condition, the precondition that non price competition improves quality is that the proportion of high risk patient’s segment is lower than a certain point. Also it got the conclusion that the effect of competition on the social welfare lies in the reimbursement rate and the ratio of high risk patient. When the reimbursement rate is high and the ratio of high risk patients is high, the competition can improve social welfare; also when the reimbursement rate is low and the ratio of high risk patients is low, the competition can improve social welfare. To the problem in health care system in China, the advice was given on how to got the equilibrium.