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供应商与零售商提前期均可控的供应链合作模型
引用本文:赵明.供应商与零售商提前期均可控的供应链合作模型[J].山西师范大学学报,2013(3):28-32.
作者姓名:赵明
作者单位:安徽交通职业技术学院管理工程系,安徽合肥230051
基金项目:安徽省高等学校省级自然科学研究项目(KJ2013B072)
摘    要:假设供应商和零售商的提前期均可控,研究了由一个供应商和一个零售商组成的供应链的协调问题.首先,建立了分散决策下的Stackelberg博弈模型,给出了供应商和零售商的最优解求解过程.其次,建立了一体化决策模型,得到供应链系统的最优解;再次,通过数值实例说明集中决策增加了零售商成本,降低了供应商成本和供应链总成本,同时,零售商的订货策略由少批量多批次转变为大批量少批次订货策略;最后,给出了双方进行合作的条件.

关 键 词:可控提前期  供应链合作  Stackelberg博弈

The Supply Chain Cooperation Model of Controllable Lead-times between Supplier and Retailor
ZHAO Ming.The Supply Chain Cooperation Model of Controllable Lead-times between Supplier and Retailor[J].Journal of Shanxi Teachers University,2013(3):28-32.
Authors:ZHAO Ming
Institution:ZHAO Ming ( Department of Management Engineering ,Anhui Communications Vocational and Technical College, Hefei 250051, Anhui, China)
Abstract:Assuming the supplier and retailor lead-times are controllable, this paper studies the cooperation problem of a supply chain between a supplier and a retailor. Firstly, the stackelbery model based on the decen- tralized decision is set up, and the procedure for the optimum solutions between supplier and retailor is given. Second|y, through establishing the integration decision the optimum solution of the supply chain system is ob- tained. Thirdly, the numberical example shows that the cost of retailor decreases, and that of supplier and supply chain increases by integration decision. At the same time, the ording strategy of retailor is changed from small quantities and large batches to large quanties and small bathes. Finally, the conditions of bilatreal cooperation are provided.
Keywords:contro'lable lead-time  supply chain cooperation  Stackelberg game
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